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Relicensing requirements for professionals who move across borders
are widespread. In this article, we measure the effects of occupational
licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician retraining assignment
rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates
indicate large returns to acquiring an occupational license and neg-
ative selection into licensing status. We also develop a model of op-
timal license acquisition that, together with the empirical results,
suggests that stricter relicensing requirements may lead not only to
practitioner rents but also to lower average quality of service in the
market for physicians.
I. Introduction
Restricted entry into an occupation through occupational licensing re-
quirements is a widespread phenomenon. At least 18% of the workforce
in the United States is affected by occupational licensing, exceeding both
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minimum wage coverage and membership in unions. Occupational li-
censing is also widespread in many other countries. In the European
Union, for example, occupational entry restrictions are thought to sub-
stantially affect incentives for internal migration and labor mobility among
member states. Licensing requirements not only restrict entry into pro-
fessional occupations, such as medicine, dentistry, and law, but also entry
into less skilled occupations, such as haircutting and cosmetology (see
Kleiner 2000).
In the traditional theory of economic regulation, occupational licensing
is generally thought of as an institution that allows practitioners to capture
monopoly rents (Friedman and Kuznets 1945; Stigler 1971). Licensing is
regarded as a tool used by practitioners to restrict labor supply and drive
up the price of labor. More recent theoretical analyses of occupational
licensing, however, focus on the conditions under which occupational
licensing can be socially beneficial. Licensing may improve the average
quality of service offered by practitioners when the entry of less competent
practitioners is prevented or when less competent practitioners are forced
to increase their investments in human capital (see, e.g., Shapiro 1986).
The social loss due to excess wages may be outweighed by the social
gains from a higher quality of service.
The theoretical ambiguity over the net social benefits of occupational
licensing is accompanied by an inconclusive empirical literature. Empirical
studies usually find higher mean earnings for individuals in regulated
occupations, holding observed human capital levels constant (see, e.g.,
Muzondo and Pazderka 1980; Kleiner 2000; and Kleiner and Kudrle 2000).
But the data used in these studies generally do not permit identification
of the causal effect of entry restrictions on earnings and thus inference
on the presence of rents. Entry restrictions and self-selection into the
regulated occupation are often confounded. Reliable evidence that li-
censing improves the average quality of service offered by practitioners
is even more rare. The main difficulty in measuring quality effects is in
obtaining accurate measures of practitioner quality.1
In this article, the effects of occupational licensing are measured using
data on the labor market outcomes of immigrant physicians in Israel. The
data allow us to identify the returns to an occupational license free of
biases due to nonrandom selection into licensing status. Identification of
the returns is possible for several reasons. First, the immigrant physicians
in the data are a relatively homogeneous group of individuals in terms of
1 Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) indirectly measure quality effects by comparing
the dental health of individuals from different states that vary in their entry
requirements for dentists. Angrist and Guryan (2003) examine the effect of teacher
certification requirements on teacher quality as measured by educational back-
ground. Both studies find small quality effects.
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education and experience. Second, many immigrant physicians did not
get relicensed and/or obtain employment in their original profession. This
is important, since identification of the returns to an occupational license
may be difficult for the simple reason that there may be very little variation
in licensing status among individuals with similar education and training
levels (Pashigian 1980). Third, and perhaps most important, the Israel
Ministry of Health assigned immigrant physicians to one of two different
relicensing tracks, depending on previous experience. Track assignment
is not directly based on unobservables, and the two relicensing tracks are
inherently different in terms of the likelihood of acquiring a license. The
form of identification in this article is, therefore, unique relative to stan-
dard studies of occupational licensing.
The Israel Ministry of Health’s assignment rule places immigrant phy-
sicians on either a retraining track that requires the passing of a general
medical knowledge licensing exam (the exam track) or a retraining track
that grants an exemption to the exam and issues a temporary general
practitioner license for 6 months (the observation track). The temporary
license allows the practice of medicine under the observation of native
physicians. At the end of the 6-month period, immigrant physicians on
the observation track receive a permanent license with near certainty.
Retraining track assignment for almost all of the immigrants in the sample
follows a “20-year rule”: immigrants with more than 20 years of previous
physician experience are assigned to the observation track; those with less
than 20 years have to pass the relicensing exam.
It is important to note that the physician relicensing regime in Israel
is not unique. In the United States, for example, physicians who migrate
across states must also be relicensed, and, in many states, exemption from
a relicensing exam is a function of previous physician experience. The 10-
year rule of state licensing boards requires migrant physicians who have
not passed a national board exam within 10 years to take a Special Purpose
Examination (SPEX), which tests their general medical knowledge. Phy-
sicians who have passed a national board exam within 10 years are exempt
from the SPEX and are granted a license.2 Since other countries use re-
licensing regimes that are similar to that used in Israel, especially for
immigrants or internal migrants, the results in this study may be quite
relevant in other contexts. According to ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the returns to acquiring a medical license, immigrants who
get relicensed have mean monthly earnings that are between 90% and
2 The states that require the SPEX for migrant physicians who have not passed
a national board test within 10 years or who are not board certified are Alabama,
California, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. See http://
www.ama-assn.org for details.
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114% higher than their unlicensed counterparts. However, OLS estimates
are biased to the extent that licensing status is related to potential outcomes
without a license. Instrumental variables estimates that exploit the re-
training assignment rule and isolate the returns to a license among indi-
viduals who would not have obtained a license had they not been assigned
to the observation track yield an increase in mean monthly earnings that
is much higher than that estimated by OLS. Instrumental variables (IV)
estimates of the returns to a license range between 180% and 340%.3 The
large IV estimates, compared to OLS estimates, are suggestive of both the
presence of rents and negative selection into licensing status. By negative
selection, we mean that immigrant physicians who acquire a license have
lower intrinsic earnings potential (in the absence of a license) than those
who do not.
In order to give an economic interpretation to the OLS and IV estimates
and to address the effects of relicensing on the average quality of service,
we also develop a model of optimal license acquisition. The theory is
linked to the empirical work by showing what OLS and IV are estimating
according to the model. The model implies that when IV estimates exceed
OLS estimates, stricter relicensing requirements may lead to lower average
quality of service in the licensed occupation. The policy implication of
the findings is that lowering the costs to immigrant physicians of acquiring
a medical license may raise average physician quality.
As a robustness check on the IV results, the returns to an occupational
license are also estimated using a quantile treatment effects (QTE) model
(Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens 2002). The QTE estimates also account for
the endogeneity of licensing status and are less sensitive than standard IV
techniques to the inclusion of high-earnings outliers and zero earnings
for the unemployed. The QTE estimates show that the returns to an
occupational license are largest at the upper quantiles of the earnings
distribution. Conventional quantile regression estimates produce the larg-
est returns at the lower quantiles. The QTE estimates of the counterfactual
distribution of earnings without a license indicate negative selection into
licensing status at all examined quantiles.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section briefly
describes the institutional setting of immigrant physician relicensing in
Israel. Section III formulates the model of optimal license acquisition.
Section IV describes the data, reports OLS estimates, and presents a
graphical analysis of the correlation in the discontinuities in licensing
and earnings outcomes that forms the basis of identification. Section V
3 Note that we estimate the returns to license acquisition as opposed to the
returns to physician practice. We focus on license acquisition rather than physician
practice because we have only one instrument (track assignment), and the channel
from institutional design to license acquisition is more direct.
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outlines the estimation strategy. Section VI reports reduced-form, IV,
and QTE estimates of the returns to a license. Section VII summarizes
and concludes.
II. Background
The recent mass immigration wave to Israel from the former Soviet
Union contained an unusually large number of physicians. Between Oc-
tober 1989 and August 1993, approximately 12,500 Soviet physicians ar-
rived in Israel, nearly doubling the potential supply in the market for
physicians. Even before the arrival of immigrant physicians, Israel had
one of the highest physician-to-population ratios in the world. The num-
ber of doctors per 100,000 Israelis in 1989 was 285. In the same year in
the United States, there were only 216 doctors per 100,000 Americans.
However, the demand for medical services substantially increased in Israel,
as the population grew by 10% during the immigration period.
According to Israeli immigration law, physicians who are licensed to
practice medicine in a foreign country and who have their foreign medical
credentials recognized by the Israel Ministry of Health must pass a re-
licensing exam in order to legally practice medicine. However, immigrant
physicians who practiced clinical medicine and who have substantial pre-
vious physician experience are exempt from the relicensing exam. Until
November 1992, the cutoff number of years required for exemption from
the licensing exam was 20; the cutoff was subsequently lowered to 14.
The lowering of the cutoff was abrupt and not publicized beforehand.
Approximately 96% of the Soviet immigrant physicians in our data were
subject to the 20-year rule rather than the 14-year rule.
Immigrant physicians who are granted an exemption from the licensing
exam must work under observation for 6 months in designated public
hospitals or community clinics. During the 6-month observation period,
immigrants receive a salary and a small stipend from the Ministry of
Absorption. At the end of the 6-month period, these immigrants receive,
with near certainty, a permanent license in general medicine. Immigrants
who are assigned to the exam track cannot switch to the “easier” obser-
vation track. A relicensing track assignment is determined by the gov-
ernment and is binding.
Immigrant physicians who are assigned to the exam track are eligible,
but not required, to participate in a government-sponsored examination
preparation course. Over 90% of immigrants who are referred to the
licensing exam choose to participate in a preparation course. Preparation
courses last 6 months, are offered twice a year, and are held in public
hospitals throughout the country. In order to be accepted into a prepa-
ration course, it is necessary to successfully complete a medical termi-
nology language course that also lasts 6 months. Immigrant physicians
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who participate in the preparation course receive minimal income support
from the Ministry of Absorption. A permanent license in general medicine
is acquired after passing the exam.
Upon successful completion of the relicensing requirements, all im-
migrant physicians, independent of previous experience, must request to
be recognized as specialists in order to practice medicine in their former
specialty. The Ministry of Health denies an overwhelming majority of
these requests. Immigrant physicians whose requests are denied must ful-
fill a postlicensing residency requirement that includes successful com-
pletion of two specialty exams. The residency requirement can last a
number of years, depending upon medical specialty. The status of specialist
is not required for performing rounds in hospitals or treating patients in
residential communities as a general practitioner. Only a small percentage
of immigrants were in specialist residency at the time of the immigrant
physician survey.
III. The Model
The decision to acquire an occupational license can be described within
a general model of optimal license acquisition. The model assumes a con-
tinuum of workers of skill type h, where h is drawn from a distribution
with support . Individuals live for two periods and have a sub-F(7) [h, h]¯—jective discount rate r. In the first period, individuals choose whether to
invest in acquiring a license or not. In the second period, all individuals
work. Acquisition of a license in the first period involves psychological,
out-of-pocket, and opportunity costs. The monetary equivalent of psy-
chological costs includes the effort expended in studying for exams and/
or meeting other licensing requirements. The out-of-pocket costs include
tuition, fees, and commuting expenses. The opportunity costs are the
forgone wages the individual could have earned in the unlicensed occu-
pation in the first period. While out-of-pocket and psychological costs
are likely to be relatively lower for more skilled (higher h) individuals,
the opportunity costs of acquiring a license are likely to be relatively
higher. The assumption that these costs vary among individuals of dif-
ferent types generates selection into the licensed occupation.4
The out-of-pocket and psychological costs of acquiring a license are
specified as , reflecting the assumption that it is relatively easier forC/h
more highly skilled individuals to study for the licensing exam and that
there is a positive correlation between skill level and pretraining assets.
Highly skilled immigrants are likely to be less liquidity constrained. Pro-
duction functions in the licensed and unlicensed sectors, andY (h, N )L L
4 The license acquisition model developed here is similar to the general model
of training participation and earnings described in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith
(1999).
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, and the marginal products of labor in both sectors are assumedY (h, N )U U
to be increasing in h, thus generating higher opportunity costs to acquire
a license for more highly skilled individuals. It is also assumed that there
are diminishing returns with respect to employment, and , in bothN NL U
occupations. The wages in the licensed and unlicensed occupations, wL
and , are defined as the marginal products of labor in the two occu-wU
pations, respectively. The wages and are, therefore, increasing inw wL U
h and decreasing in , . In what follows, the arguments ofN ip L, U wi L
and will be suppressed for convenience.wU
Individuals seek to maximize lifetime income by choosing whether or
not to acquire a license. Individuals choose to acquire a license and work
in the licensed occupation in the second period, rather than work in the
unlicensed occupation in both periods, when
w w CL U ≥ w . (1)U( )1 r h
Equation (1) states that a license will be acquired when the discounted
increase in earnings in the second period is greater than or equal to the
sum of all costs in the first period.5
The decision rule can also be expressed in terms of the maximum C
that an individual of type h is willing to incur to acquire a license. This
maximum cost component is denoted as . The maximum cost com-C (h)max
ponent is found by equating lifetime income in the two occupations,C (h)max
( )h[w  2 r w ]L U
( )C h p . (2)max ( )1 r
An individual of type h chooses to work in the licensed occupation
if and chooses to work in the unlicensed occupation ifC (h) ≥ Cmax
C (h) ! C.max
The maximum cost component can be shown to vary with hC (h)max
in the following way:
( ) ( ) ( )C h [w  2 r w ] h[(w /h) 2 r (w /h)]max L U L U
p  . (3)( ) ( )h 1 r 1 r
Note that each of the two terms after the equals sign in equation (3) can
be positive or negative, even if and at everyw 1 w w /h 1 w /hL U L U
h. If , then highly skilled individuals are willing to payC (h) /h 1 0max
more for a license, and there is positive selection into licensing status. In
5 Uncertainty both in successfully meeting licensing requirements or in ob-
taining a job in the licensed occupation after completing the licensing requirements
can be thought of as factors that reduce the discounted wage premium. Adding
uncertainty to the model does not change anything of substance.
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this case, individuals with work in the unlicensed occupation,h  [h, h*]
—and individuals with work in the licensed occupation. Theh  [h*, h]¯
variable is the point in the skill distribution where Ifh* C (h)p C.max
, then highly skilled individuals are willing to pay less forC (h) /h ! 0max
a license, and there is negative selection into licensing status. In this latter
case, individuals with work in the licensed occupation, andh  [h, h*]
—individuals with work in the unlicensed occupation.6h  [h*, h]¯
The theory outlined above can be linked to the empirical work by
noting that OLS yields a regression-adjusted estimate of
( ) ( )E w FC h 1 CE w FC h ! C[ ] [ ]L max U max
( )pE w w FC h 1 C (4)[ ]L U max
( ) ( ){E w FC h 1 CE w FC h ! C },[ ] [ ]U max U max
where and are the mean wages,E [w FC (h) 1 C] E [w FC (h) ! C]L max U max
according to the model, in the licensed and unlicensed occupations, re-
spectively. The first term after the equals sign in equation (4) is the effect
of treatment on the treated, and the second term is selection bias. Ordinary
least squares clearly does not identify the causal effect of acquiring a
license.
In contrast to OLS, IV yields a regression-adjusted estimate of the local
average treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996),
which is a causal expression. In this case, LATE is
( )E w w FC 1 C h 1 C , (5)[ ]L U 1 max 0
where is the lower C incurred when assigned to the observation trackC0
and is the higher C incurred when assigned to the exam track. AssumingC1
that LATE is a good approximation to the effect of treatment on the treated,
; the differenceE [w w FC 1 C (h) 1 C ] ≈ E [w w FC (h) 1 C]L U 1 max 0 L U max
between OLS and IV is the selection bias. If IV exceeds OLS, selection
bias is negative, and, according to the model, the least-skilled (lowest h,
lowest earnings potential) immigrant physicians choose to become licensed
physicians in the host country.
IV. The Data
The population of immigrant physicians in this study consists of im-
migrants who arrived in Israel from the former USSR between October
1989 and June 1992, submitted a request to the Israel Ministry of Health
to start the process toward relicensing, and had recognized medical cre-
dentials in the former USSR. Of the immigrants who declared at the
6 A fuller development of the model can be found in an earlier version of the
article posted on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) at http://papers
.ssrn.com.
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airport on the day of arrival that they were physicians in the former
USSR, 27% did not submit their credentials to the Ministry of Health.
Of the immigrants who submitted their credentials, 3% did not have their
credentials recognized. Among immigrants who had their medical cre-
dentials recognized, 3% were not referred to one of the two retraining
tracks. These latter immigrants were either required to complete a 1-year
internship before being eligible for the exam track or were immediately
granted recognition as specialists. The total number of immigrant phy-
sicians in this restricted population is 6,754.7
Between the months of May and November of 1994, 731 immigrant
physicians, who were confirmed by the Israel Ministry of Health to have
been physicians in the former USSR, were surveyed in face-to-face in-
terviews by Russian-speaking enumerators, using a questionnaire written
in Russian. The survey was conducted under the auspices of the JDC-
Brookdale Institute of Jerusalem, the Israel Ministry of Health, and the
Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The random sample of 731
immigrant physicians was stratified by assigned retraining track and geo-
graphical region. The goal was to interview 10% of the restricted pop-
ulation. A reserve list of immigrants was prepared, according to the same
stratification rules, to substitute for those on the original list who could
not be interviewed. In total, 1,002 immigrant physicians were approached
for interviewing. In descending order of importance, those on the original
list who were not interviewed either were not located, refused to be
interviewed, return migrated, or had passed away.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays selected descriptive statistics for the sample by assigned
retraining track. Of the 731 immigrant physicians in the sample, only two
immigrants did not have a retraining track coded. Of the 414 immigrant
physicians assigned to the exam track, according to either the 14-year rule
or the 20-year rule, 73% passed the relicensing exam. Immigrants who
were assigned to the exam track and did not acquire a license either never
took the exam or took the exam and failed. Of the 315 immigrant phy-
sicians assigned to the observation track, according to either the 14-year
rule or the 20-year rule, 89% worked under observation and acquired a
permanent license. The 11% among this latter group who are coded as
not having acquired a permanent license reported that they never looked
for a place to begin work under observation.
Overall, 80% of the immigrant physicians in the sample acquired a
license, but there is a large 16-percentage-point difference between the
7 Nonsubmitters to the Ministry of Health are much more likely than submitters
to be over 55 years of age on arrival. Immigrants who did not have their credentials
recognized are younger than those who had their credentials recognized.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Exam Track Observation Track
% Licensed 72.71 88.57
% Employed 86.23 65.40
% Physician 58.70 37.14
Monthly earnings (NIS) 2,552
(1,811)
1,703
(2,011)
Months in Israel 44.31
(6.24)
42.68
(7.45)
Age on arrival 34.54
(5.00)
53.06
(7.36)
Previous physician experience 10.32
(4.82)
28.18
(7.57)
% Male 44.44 44.13
% Married on arrival 84.30 79.36
No. children under age 18 on arrival 1.23
(.75)
.59
(.76)
% from Russia 46.14 41.59
% from Ukraine 16.67 23.81
% from city 1 1,000,000 52.17 53.33
% Advanced medical degree 26.81 25.4
% Former specialist 40.34 85.08
% Former general practitioner 22.95 18.73
% Former pediatrician 16.18 12.70
% Former obstetrics/gynecology 7.49 5.71
% Arrived in 1991–92 77.3 67.62
N 414 315
Note.—The table reports means and percentages by assigned retraining track. Standard deviations are
in parentheses. Monthly earnings are in 1994 New Israeli Shekels (NIS), where 1 NIS equals US$.33.
There are 382 exam track earnings observations and 294 observation track earnings observations(including
zeros for the unemployed).
proportion acquiring it on the exam track and the proportion acquiring
it on the observation track. The most obvious difference between indi-
viduals on the two different tracks is age at time of arrival. Individuals
assigned to the exam track are, on average, 18 years younger, have 18
years less physician experience in the former USSR, and have more chil-
dren under the age of 18 living at home at the time of arrival.
Table 1 also shows that mean monthly earnings (including zeros for
the unemployed), the employment rate, and the rate of employment as a
physician at the time of the survey are higher among immigrants assigned
to the exam track. Note that a considerable proportion of immigrant
physicians on the observation track are not employed as physicians. Im-
migrants who are employed but not working as physicians are, for the
most part, working in skilled occupations as post–secondary education
teachers, social workers, qualified nurses, optometrists, medical techni-
cians, and paramedics. There is only a small proportion of immigrant
physicians working in less skilled occupations, such as unqualified nurse-
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Table 2
OLS Estimates of the Returns to a Medical License
Regressors
Full Sample Discontinuity Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Licensed 1,279
(140)
1,211
(140)
1,162
(141)
175
(138)
1,254
(373)
169
(358)
% Impact 1.095 .979 .904 .067 1.137 .077
Physician . . . . . . . . . 2,324
(158)
. . . 1,885
(301)
Experience . . . . . . 4.90(25.1)
56.21
(23.24)
1,111
(547)
928
(462)
2Experience . . . . . . 1.35(.61)
2.05
(.58)
27.15
(13.93)
22.80
(11.65)
Other regressors No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RMSE 1,876 1,672 1,648 1,390 1,631 1,447
2R .0711 .2847 .3073 .5086 .3227 .4702
N 676 676 676 676 181 181
Note.—Robust standard errors are in parentheses. RMSEp root mean squared error. Other regressors
include dummies for age on arrival, year of arrival, months in Israel, gender, marital status, profession
of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence, republic of origin, advanced medical degrees,
previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice, and type of reported earnings (after tax and/
or after other deductions). The discontinuity sample in cols. 5 and 6 uses the subsample of observations
between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience.
maids, cleaners in institutions, security guards, and skilled and unskilled
workers in industry.8
In terms of gender composition, size of last city of residence in the
former USSR (more than 1,000,000 inhabitants), continuation of studies
in the former USSR toward an advanced medical degree, and the number
of months since arrival, the immigrants are quite similar by retraining
track. There are only slight differences in marital status on arrival, republic
of origin, and type of medical practice in the former USSR. Note that
over 95% of the immigrants in the sample arrived at the start of the
immigration wave, during the years 1990–91. Overall, the similarities in
immigrant characteristics by assigned retraining track, except for char-
acteristics related to age, constitute strong evidence that retraining track
assignment was indeed mainly a function of previous experience. The
differences in former specialist status by track arise because specialist
status is also a function of age in the former Soviet Union.
B. OLS Estimates
OLS estimates of the increase in mean monthly earnings due to ac-
quisition of a license are reported in table 2. We concentrate on monthly
earnings because there is little overall variation in hours worked among
8 Among immigrant physicians employed as physicians, 41% work for the
government (local and national). The remainder work for health maintenance
organizations and other private employers. Only 6% found physician work as a
direct continuation of retraining.
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these immigrants, and hours of work are poorly measured. Column 1
does not include any other covariates and yields a precisely estimated
coefficient on licensed of 1,279 New Israeli Shekel (NIS).9 In 1994, the
year in which earnings are reported, 1 NISp approximately US$.33. The
estimated increase in earnings of 1,279 NIS corresponds to a percentage
impact of 109%.10
Column 2 adds covariates to the regression but excludes previous phy-
sician experience. The other covariates include dummies for age on arrival,
year of arrival, months in Israel, gender, marital status, profession of
spouse, number of children under age 18 living at home on arrival, size
of last city of residence, republic of origin, advanced medical degrees,
previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice, and type of
reported earnings (after tax and/or after other deductions). The coefficient
on licensed in this latter regression is a precisely estimated 1,211, which
corresponds to a percentage impact of 98%.
Column 3 adds years of physician experience in the USSR and its
square. The coefficient on licensed further decreases to 1,162 but is still
precisely estimated. The percentage impact is 90%. Column 4 adds an
indicator for being employed as a physician. The physician dummy is an
interaction between having acquired a license and being employed as a
physician. The coefficient on licensed turns negative, is quite small in
magnitude, and is not precisely estimated. The coefficient on the physician
dummy, however, is substantial. The OLS results do not indicate a sig-
nificant return to a license when not employed as a practicing physician.
Note that a significant coefficient on licensed in this latter specification
would have been suggestive of a signaling value to license acquisition.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the specifications in columns 3 and 4 for the
subsample of immigrants who have previous physician experience be-
tween 14 and 26 years. This subsample of immigrants defines the dis-
continuity sample. Restricting the analysis to the discontinuity sample
helps control for differences in unobservables between immigrants of
different ages (e.g., differences in the quality of medical education in the
former USSR). The discontinuity sample also has a relatively greater de-
gree of variation in assigned retraining track than the full sample.11
The estimated coefficient on licensed in the discontinuity sample is
9 All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
10 Monthly earnings include zeros for the unemployed. The percentage impact
is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient on licensed to the fitted value from the
regression with the licensed dummy set to zero and other covariates set to the
means among individuals with a license, when other covariates are included.
11 The experience levels 14 and 26 are the 45th and 75th percentiles, respectively,
in the previous physician experience distribution. The experience distribution is
skewed to the right with a mean of 16, a standard deviation of 11, and a median
of 18.
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larger than in the corresponding specification in the full sample. With a
quadratic in previous physician experience and no indicator for physician
employment, the coefficient on licensed is a precisely estimated 1,254.
The percentage impact is 114%. Column 6 reports the results with the
physician employment indicator added. The estimated coefficient on li-
censed is positive but is negligible in magnitude and imprecisely estimated.
Additional OLS results that are not reported in table 2, for the sake
of brevity, indicate that within the retraining track the increase in mean
monthly earnings due to acquisition of a license is similarly large in mag-
nitude. The percentage impact on earnings for immigrant physicians as-
signed to the exam track is 99%, with other covariates and previous
physician experience and its square included in the regression. The cor-
responding percentage impact on earnings among physicians assigned to
the observation track is somewhat smaller but not significantly different.
In addition, the effect of license acquisition on employment probabilities
is similar to the effect of track assignment on physician employment
probabilities, which is explicitly considered below.
C. Graphical Discontinuity Analysis
The OLS estimates presented in the previous subsection do not exploit
the Ministry of Health’s retraining assignment rule. The assignment rule
can be used to construct instrumental variables estimates of the returns
to an occupational license even though the assignment rule is a near de-
terministic function of years of previous physician experience, and pre-
vious physician experience directly affects earnings in the host country.
Identification relies on matching discontinuities (or nonlinearities) in the
relationship between previous physician experience and licensing status
and discontinuities in the relationship between previous physician ex-
perience and earnings. The correlation between these discontinuities iden-
tifies the causal effect of acquiring a license on earnings as long as it is
the assignment rule and not some other mechanism that is generating the
discontinuities in licensing outcomes (see Angrist and Krueger 1999).
The discontinuities in licensing and labor market outcomes resulting
from the retraining assignment rule are illustrated graphically in figures
1–3. The figures are smoothed by estimating weighted local linear re-
gressions that do not straddle the break points of 14 and 20 years of
previous physician experience (see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001).
Figure 1 plots the proportion of immigrant physicians assigned to the
observation track along with the residuals from a linear probability model
that has acquisition of a license as the dependent variable and that excludes
previous physician experience as a covariate.
Note that in figure 1 the proportion assigned to the observation track
is zero in the range 0–13 years of experience. From 14 to 19 years of
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Fig. 1.—Track assignment and license acquisition
experience, the proportion fluctuates between 12% and 33%. This is due
to the small number (32 out of 729 immigrants) assigned to the observation
track according to the later instituted 14-year rule. At 20 years of ex-
perience, the proportion sharply jumps up. At 20 years of experience and
more, the proportion fluctuates between 92% and 100%. Immigrant phy-
sicians in this latter experience group who are not assigned to the ob-
servation track did not previously practice clinical medicine.
Figure 1 also shows that the license probability residuals jump up to-
gether with jumps in the proportion assigned to the observation track.
License probability residuals remain high after 20 years of experience but
drop off rather sharply after 30 years of experience. Immigrant physicians
with 30 or more years of experience are, on average, 60 years old. Clearly,
the incentive to invest in license acquisition is much weaker the closer
one is to retirement age.
Figure 2 plots license acquisition residuals and physician employment
residuals from separate linear probability models that exclude previous
physician experience. The figure shows that employment as a physician
follows licensing status quite closely. Figure 3 examines the relationship
between monthly earnings residuals and license acquisition residuals. The
matching of the discontinuity at 20 years of experience and the change
in trend in earnings after 20 years of experience is quite evident.
Fig. 2.—License acquisition and physical employment outcomes
Fig. 3.—License acquisition and monthly earnings
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V. Estimation Strategy
The estimation framework that we consider is a linear, constant-effects
model that connects the earnings of immigrant i at time t, , with theYit
occupational licensing status of individual i at time t, , plus a vectorLit
of immigrant characteristics at the time of arrival, and a random errorXi
component specific to individuals at time :t, e it
′Y p X b td L a e . (6)it i it it
Time in Israel, t, is, like the elements of , widely believed to be ex-Xi
ogenous to potential labor market outcomes in Israel among those im-
migrants who arrived in the first 3 years of the immigration wave. The
variable t generically captures changes in language ability, social networks,
and knowledge of local institutions, and is also correlated with the size
of the last city of residence in the former USSR (included in ). Im-Xi
migrants who arrived earlier generally came from big cities in which there
was greater access to information, government offices, and consulates.
Measures of English and Hebrew ability at the time of the survey and
host country work experience are endogenous (and not included in )Xi
but are also strongly correlated with t. In empirical implementation, t is
represented by a series of 6-month dummy variables (e.g., a dummy for
immigrants who have been in Israel between 1 and 6 months, a dummy
for those who have been in Israel between 7 and 12 months, etc.).
The interpretation of equation (6) is that it describes the earnings of
immigrants under alternative assignments of licensing status, controlling
for any effects of and t. However, since is not randomly assignedX Li it
and is likely to be correlated with potential earnings, , OLS estimatese it
of equation (6) do not have a causal interpretation. Instrumental variables
estimates of equation (6) do have a causal interpretation as long as it is
reasonable to assume that, after controlling for and t, the associationXi
between assignment to the observation track and monthly earnings is
solely due to the association between observation track assignment and
licensing status.
In IV estimation, the first-stage relationship between licensing status,
assignment to the observation track, , and t isXi
′L p X p  tp  TR p  y , (7)it i 0 1 i 2 it
where indicates assignment to the observation track andTR p 1 TR pi i
indicates assignment to the exam track. The error term is defined as0 yit
the residual from the population regression of on and t and theL Xit i
instrument, . This residual captures other factors that are correlatedTRi
with licensing status and may be correlated with .e it
The key identifying assumption that underlies estimation using asTRi
an instrument is that any effects of previous physician experience on
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monthly earnings in Israel are adequately controlled by the smooth func-
tions of previous physician experience included in and partialed out′X bi
of by the inclusion of smooth functions of previous physician ex-TRi
perience in . If this assumption is reasonable, the discontinuities in′X pi 0
earnings with previous physician experience, as depicted in the graphical
analysis, can be attributed to the acquisition of an occupational license.12
The same discussion above carries through for measuring the effect of
working as a physician in place of the effect of acquiring a license. How-
ever, since we have only one instrument, we focus on the results that use
license acquisition, rather than physician practice, as the sole endogenous
variable. We believe that focusing on the licensing outcome is more natural
because the channel from institutional design to license acquisition is more
direct. Government selection of a retraining track for an immigrant phy-
sician, which is not directly based on immigrant unobservables, more
closely corresponds to random assignment of a license as opposed to
random assignment to a physician job.
VI. Estimation Results
A. Reduced-Form Estimates
Reduced-form estimates of the effect of being assigned to the obser-
vation track are reported in table 3. Columns 1–3 of table 3 report co-
efficients for the first stage described in equation (7), that is, the effect of
being assigned to the observation track on licensing status. In all three
linear probability models, assignment to the observation track increases
the probability of acquiring a license. The estimated coefficient on track,
without any other regressors, is .159. Including other regressors increases
the estimated coefficient to .231. Adding previous physician experience
and its square further increases the estimated coefficient on track to .338.
Column 4 reports the same specification as in column 3 in the discon-
tinuity sample. The coefficient on track in this latter specification is .258.
In all four specifications, the coefficient on track is precisely estimated.
Columns 5–7 of table 3 report the effect of being assigned to the ob-
servation track on the probability of employment as a physician in linear
probability models. Adding previous physician experience yields a sta-
tistically significant coefficient of .234. The specification with previous
physician experience in the discontinuity sample only, reported in column
8, produces a statistically significant coefficient of .258. The first-stage
relationship between physician practice and track assignment is slightly
weaker than the first-stage relationship between license acquisition and
track assignment. The physician employment regressions in columns 6–8
12 Card (1999) surveys evidence supporting the smoothness assumption in the
relationship between experience and earnings.
Table 3
Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of Track on Monthly Earnings, License Acquisition, and Physician Employment
Regressors
Licensed Physician Employment Monthly Earnings
Full Sample
Discontinuity
Sample Full Sample
Discontinuity
Sample Full Sample
Discontinuity
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Track .1587
(.0283)
.2305
(.0308)
.3383
(.0490)
.2853
(.0679)
.2155
(.0365)
.0206
(.0584)
.2336
(.0754)
.2576
(.1230)
849
(149)
42
(207)
571
(255)
628
(371)
% Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3325 .0094 .1409 .2262
Experience . . . . . . .0053
(.0075)
.2198
(.1009)
. . . . . . .0222
(.0077)
.1889
(.1525)
. . . . . . 14.12
(28.01)
765
(530)
Experience2 . . . . . . .0002
(.0002)
.0052
(.0025)
. . . . . . .0001
(.0001)
.0038
(.0038)
. . . . . . 1.38
(.62)
19.49
(13.52)
Other regressors No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
RMSE .3961 .3908 .3854 .3269 .4891 .4621 .4551 .4579 1,900 1,740 1,705 1,675
2R .0380 .0879 .1153 .2260 .0456 .1716 .1987 .2605 .0469 .2257 .2589 .2857
N 729 729 729 203 729 729 729 203 676 676 676 181
Note.—Robust standard errors are in parentheses. RMSE p root mean squared error. Other regressors include dummies for age of arrival, year of arrival, months in
Israel, gender, marital status, profession of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence, republic of origin, advanced medical degrees, previous specialist status,
previous type of medical practice, and type of reported earnings (after tax and/or after other deductions). The discontinuity sample in cols. 4, 8, and 12 uses the subsample
of observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience. The licensed and physician employment regressions are linear probability models. The physician
employment regressions include interaction terms between experience and year of arrival.
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also require interaction terms between previous experience and year of
arrival that have no explanatory power in columns 2–4.
Columns 9–11 of table 3 report reduced-form effects of being assigned
to the observation track on mean monthly earnings. Without controls for
other regressors or previous physician experience, there is a negative as-
sociation between assignment to the observation track and monthly earn-
ings. The track variable is picking up a downward trend in mean earnings
with previous physician experience. The association between being assigned
to the observation track and monthly earnings becomes significantly pos-
itive with the addition of other regressors and previous physician experience
and its square. The coefficient on track in this latter specification is 571
with a standard error of 255. The percentage impact is 14%. Column 12
reports the same specification as in column 11 in the discontinuity sample
only. The coefficient on track is stronger, 628, but somewhat less precisely
estimated. The percentage impact increases to 23%.
As the reduced-form estimates illustrate, IV estimates of the returns to
a medical license and the returns to physician practice should differ only
by a scale factor.13 The IV returns to physician practice are, in general,
larger than the IV returns to a license, as was found in the OLS results.
In what follows, we focus on the returns to a license rather than on the
returns to practicing as a physician, for the reasons previously mentioned.
B. Instrumental Variables Estimates
Instrumental variables estimates of the effect of acquiring a license are
reported in table 4.14 Acquisition of a license is instrumented with assigned
retraining track. Columns 1–3 of table 4 report the estimated coefficients
on licensed without any other regressors, with other regressors but ex-
cluding previous physician experience, and with other regressors and lin-
ear and quadratic terms for previous physician experience, respectively.
The estimated coefficient on licensed with other regressors and linear and
quadratic terms for previous physician experience is 1,638 with a standard
error of 706. The percentage impact is 182%. Correcting for nonrandom
selection in licensing status yields a percentage impact that is approxi-
mately double the corresponding percentage impact produced by OLS
(90%).
13 The IV estimates of the return to a license can be calculated from the ratio
of the coefficient in the reduced-form earnings regression to the coefficient in the
reduced-form license acquisition. The IV estimates of the return to physician
practice can be calculated from the ratio of the coefficient in the reduced-form
earnings regression to the coefficient in the reduced-form physician employment
regression.
14 The instrumental variables estimates reported in this subsection deviate some-
what from the ratio of the relevant reduced-form estimates in table 3 due to
different sample sizes.
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Table 4
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Returns to a Medical License
Regressors
Full Sample
Discontinuity
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Licensed 5,244
(1,516)
178
(863)
1,638
(706)
1,865
(864)
1,886
(1,043)
% Impact .827 .086 1.818 2.617 3.422
Experience . . . . . . 1.24(25.16)
44.90
(76.64)
1,210
(619)
2Experience . . . . . . 1.17
(.62)
3.90
(4.34)
29.84
(15.82)
3Experience . . . . . . . . . .0407
(.0639)
. . .
Other regressors No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RMSE 3,245 1,722 1,659 1,672 1,646
2R . . . .2417 .2982 .2883 .3099
N 676 676 676 676 181
Note.—Robust standard errors are in parentheses. RMSE p root mean squared error. Licensed is
instrumented with track. Other regressors include dummies for age on arrival, year of arrival, months
in Israel, gender, marital status, profession of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence,
republic of origin, advanced medical degrees, previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice,
and type of reported earnings (after tax and/or after other deductions). The discontinuity sample in col.
5 uses the subsample of observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience.
Considering that instrumental variables estimates in a regression dis-
continuity design may be quite sensitive to the way in which the variable
generating the discontinuity is controlled, column 4 of table 4 reports the
results of including a third-order polynomial in previous physician ex-
perience. The estimated effect of a license in this latter specification is
1,865 with a standard error of 864. The percentage impact grows to 262%.
Column 5 of table 4 reports the results of including linear and quadratic
terms for previous physician experience in the discontinuity sample only.
The estimated coefficient on licensed further grows to 1,886 but is some-
what less precisely estimated. The percentage impact is 342%. The cor-
responding percentage impact according to OLS in table 2 is 114%. Nar-
rowing the range of the discontinuity sample produces even larger
percentage impacts, but they are less precisely estimated as the sample
size increasingly shrinks.
Additional IV results of interest that are not shown in table 4 for the
sake of brevity are as follows. First, there are no significant interactions
between licensing status and other covariates. In particular, there are no
significant interactions between licensing status and time in Israel. Li-
censing status does not affect the slope of immigrant earnings profiles,
only earnings levels. There are also no significant interactions between
licensing status and previous physician experience. Second, including sep-
arate controls for the small number of immigrant physicians who were
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assigned to the observation track according to the 14-year rule does not
change the results.15
The IV estimates in table 4 isolate the increase in mean earnings for
immigrant physicians who acquire a license. The counterfactual is an im-
migrant physician who does not acquire a license and who cannot work
as a physician. The parameter being estimated in this analysis is not the
increase in mean earnings due to the imposition of licensing requirements
on practicing physicians. This latter parameter would also be interesting
to estimate, but it is not identified. One reason that it is not identifiable,
which was already mentioned earlier, is that both licensing status and
physician employment are endogenous and we have only one valid in-
strument at our disposal.
It is also worth reiterating that the return to acquiring a medical license
and the return to practicing as a physician differ. One possible reason
why they differ is that there is signaling value to a license when not
practicing as a physician (the noncausal evidence in table 2 does not
support this hypothesis). Another possibility is that some immigrant phy-
sicians fail to use the medical license that they acquire for physician prac-
tice, perhaps because they do not receive good physician job offers. Con-
sistent with this latter explanation, the first-stage results in table 3 show
that assignment to the observation track has more of an impact on the
probability of license acquisition than on the probability of physician
employment.
Although we are not estimating the same parameter as in many other
papers in the licensing literature, it is still instructive to compare our
estimates to those found by others. It is interesting that Kleiner (2000)
reports licensing effects on hourly earnings, not taking into account non-
random selection, that are very similar in magnitude to our OLS estimates
presented in table 2. He finds that licensed dentists earn 91% more than
unlicensed biological and life scientists, and licensed lawyers earn 94%
more than unlicensed economists. Results for licensed physicians are not
reported.
Studies that estimate the effect of imposing licensing requirements in
a single profession usually find more modest earnings effects than in our
study and in Kleiner (2000). Using cross-state variation in the stringency
of regulation to become a dentist, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find that
the hourly earnings of dentists in the most regulated states are only 12%
higher than those of dentists in less regulated states. Reduced-form results
in Angrist and Guryan (2003) indicate that state licensing requirements
raise the salaries of teachers with a BA by between 3% and 5%. Given
15 Further experimentation with the small number of immigrant physicians sub-
ject to the 14-year rule does not produce reliable results. There are also no other
data sources available that could be brought into the analysis for this purpose.
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that the imposition of licensing requirements increases the probability of
license acquisition by about .5, implicit IV estimates, using state licensing
requirements as instruments, are twice as large as reduced-form estimates.
Potential Threats to Identification
There are several potential threats to a causal interpretation of the IV
results that we have presented in this study. First, since 27% of all im-
migrants who reported themselves to be physicians on arrival did not
submit their credentials to the Ministry of Health, the sample could be
biased. However, almost all of these immigrants were over 55 years of
age on arrival. It is also unlikely that younger immigrant physicians are
more likely to be misclassified by the Ministry of Health as immigrant
physicians after the credential verification process and that these immi-
grant physicians are more likely to choose to become nonphysicians.
Second, there is a possibility that assignment to the exam track and/or
failure to pass the exam led to out-migration. Information on the outcomes
of these immigrants would be missing from the sample. However, as
mentioned in Section II, return migration was one of the least important
reasons for nonresponse to the survey. Only 3.7% of those approached
to be interviewed were not interviewed because they had out-migrated
or were absent from the country for an extended period of time.
Third, physicians in the former USSR may have decided not to im-
migrate to Israel (or decided to delay immigration) based on knowledge
of the assignment rule. However, immigrant physicians were asked on
the survey if they were aware of the relicensing process upon arrival to
Israel, and only 4% responded that they had knowledge of relicensing
procedures. This is consistent with the widely held belief that early arrivals
from the former USSR were panic migrants, not economic migrants.
Interpretation
Our interpretation of the large IV estimates, compared to OLS esti-
mates, is that relicensing requirements in the medical profession led to
practitioner rents. This is consistent with standard economic theory. In
addition, our theoretical model of optimal license acquisition suggests
that when IV estimates exceed OLS estimates, the requirement of having
to pass a relicensing exam (as opposed to being observed on the job) leads
to lower average quality in the market for physicians. When IV estimates
exceed OLS estimates, there is negative selection. Negative selection im-
plies lower average quality of service under the assumption that there is
a positive association between outside earnings potential, general talent,
and physician quality, as specified in our model.
Note that the possibility of a large earnings premium coexisting with
negative selection has been raised before in the occupational licensing
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literature (see Friedman and Kuznets 1945; and, more recently, Angrist
and Guryan 2003). The combination of high psychological costs to re-
training, lengthy delays in being able to secure employment as a physician,
liquidity constraints, and relatively good outside opportunities for the
generally talented can induce the most skilled immigrant physicians in
Israel to seek employment opportunities as nonphysicians. In favor of
this interpretation is the evidence that the average age of immigrant phy-
sicians on arrival is 43, that the average number of months from arrival
to the first physician job is 36, and that most immigrant physicians who
do not acquire a license tend to work in skilled occupations. It is well
established that investment activity decreases with age, length of the in-
vestment period, and alternative returns. As in the simplest human capital
models in the schooling literature, which predict that ability bias is neg-
ative (e.g., Griliches 1977), the highest-skilled individuals are the ones
who do not invest in license acquisition, because their opportunity costs
of acquiring a license are the highest. A large earnings premium to license
acquisition is not necessarily enough to cover the costs.
A large return to licensing, such as estimated here, can also be inter-
preted as arising from high returns to occupation-specific human capital,
instead of rents and negative selection, as we have argued. Working in
favor of our rent/selection story is the finding that interactions of licensing
status with previous physician experience do not yield significant coef-
ficients on the interaction terms. Previous physician experience is gen-
erally not significant, even without interactions, and even has small neg-
ative returns in several specifications. The main reason for this result is
that many immigrant physicians who obtained jobs as physicians were
placed at the bottom of the physician job ladder in public hospitals and
community clinics, regardless of age and former specialty. For similar
reasons, negligible returns to previous work experience have also been
estimated for Soviet immigrant engineers, managers, and unskilled work-
ers (see Friedberg 2000; and Weiss, Sauer, and Gotlibovski 2003). None-
theless, substantial earnings differences remain between those who find
work at the bottom of the job hierarchy in the medical profession and
those who find work at the bottom of the job hierarchy in alternative
occupations.16
C. Quantile Regression and Treatment Effect Estimates
The constant-effects IV model relied on to measure the returns to an
occupational license has a drawback in that it does not allow for differ-
ential effects of acquiring a license at different points in the earnings
16 It is unlikely that earnings differences between professions are highly con-
founded with differences in hours worked, given that part-time jobs in Israel are
not in abundant supply.
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distribution. This can be problematic, since the earnings distribution has
a mass point at zero. In general, the effect of acquiring a license on
participation may be substantially different from the effect of acquiring
a license on conditional-on-positive mean earnings. An alternative esti-
mation strategy that is less sensitive to the inclusion of zero earnings for
the unemployed, less demanding than formal sample-selection models,
and less sensitive to high-earnings outliers is the quantile treatment effects
model (Angrist 2001; and Abadie et al. 2002). The QTE model modifies
conventional quantile regression for inclusion of an endogenous binary
regressor and provides a good robustness check on the conclusions
reached from the standard IV model. The QTE model is briefly outlined
in the appendix.
The top panel of table 5 reports quantile regression and QTE estimates
of the effect of licensing status on monthly earnings. Licensing effects are
measured at the 0.15, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.85 quantiles of the monthly
earnings distribution. Quantile regression treats licensing status as ex-
ogenous and produces the largest percentage impacts of acquiring a license,
93% and 117%, at the 0.15 and 0.25 quantiles, respectively. The percentage
impact steadily declines at higher quantiles, falling to 59% at the 0.85
quantile. At each quantile the coefficient on licensed is precisely estimated.
Quantile treatment effects estimates that correct for the endogeneity of
licensing status yield substantially different results. The percentage impact
of acquiring a license at the 0.15 and 0.25 quantiles is 50% for both,
considerably lower than the quantile regression estimates. The percentage
impact at the 0.50, 0.75, and 0.85 quantiles is, however, considerably higher
than the quantile regression estimates. The QTE model produces the
largest percentage impact, 169%, at the 0.85 quantile. At each quantile
the coefficient on licensed is precisely estimated.
Note that the highest percentage impact of 169% at the 0.85 quantile
is less than the percentage impact estimated in the corresponding speci-
fication in the constant-effects model in table 4 (182%). This suggests
that the licensing effect on mean earnings in the constant-effects model
is relatively more sensitive to high-earnings outliers than the inclusion of
zeros for the unemployed.
The bottom panel of table 5 reports licensing effects on median earnings
in the discontinuity sample only. Effects at other quantiles are difficult
to identify, given the reduced variation in earnings and smaller sample
size. The results indicate a large effect on median earnings, 239%. The
corresponding percentage impact when treating licensed as exogenous is
108%. Both effects are precisely estimated. These percentage impacts stand
in sharp contrast to the percentage impact on mean earnings in the dis-
continuity sample (342%). This again suggests greater sensitivity of stan-
dard IV to high-earnings outliers than the inclusion of zeros.
The quantile regression and QTE estimates reported in table 5 can be
Table 5
Quantile Regression and Treatment Effects Estimates
Quantile Regression Estimates Treatment Effects Estimates
.15 .25 .5 .75 .85 .15 .25 .5 .75 .85
A. Full sample:
Licensed 359
(130)
644
(163)
997
(143)
1,455
(178)
1,507
(320)
119
(4)
257
(63)
1,115
(65)
1,589
(267)
2,774
(212)
% Impact .932 1.175 .832 .782 .588 .496 .499 1.466 1.076 1.688
Pseudo 2R .1626 .2467 .2397 .2116 .2055 .1190 .1744 .2315 .1579 .1748
N 676 676 676 676 676 548 548 548 548 548
B. Discontinuity sample:
Licensed . . . . . . 1,093
(520)
. . . . . . . . . . . . 1,793
(310)
. . . . . .
% Impact . . . . . . 1.076 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.386 . . . . . .
Pseudo 2R . . . . . . .1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . .2413 . . . . . .
N . . . . . . 181 . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 . . . . . .
Note.—Other regressors include a quadratic in previous physician experience, dummies for age on arrival, year of arrival, months in Israel, republic of origin, advanced
medical degrees, previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice, and type of reported earnings (after tax and/or after other deductions). The discontinuity sample
is the subsample of observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The bootstrapped standard errors
when licensed are treated as endogenous and adjusted for the first-step estimation.
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Table 6
Earnings Quantiles without a License
Quantile
.15 .25 .5 .75 .85
A. Full sample:
Licensed immigrants 239 515 760 1,476 1,643
Unlicensed immigrants 385 548 1,199 1,859 2,563
% Selection bias .379 .060 .366 .206 .359
B. Discontinuity sample:
Licensed immigrants . . . . . . 751 . . . . . .
Unlicensed immigrants . . . . . . 1,016 . . . . . .
% Selection bias . . . . . . .261 . . . . . .
Note.—The table reports monthly earnings quantiles without a license for immigrants who acquired
a license and for immigrants who did not acquire a license. Earnings without a license for immigrants
who acquired a license are calculated using quantile treatment effect estimates. Earnings without a license
for immigrants who did not acquire a license are calculated using quantile regression estimates. The
discontinuity sample is the subsample of observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician
experience.
used to estimate the marginal distributions of monthly earnings without
a license both for immigrants who acquired a license and immigrants who
did not acquire a license. Potential earnings without a license for immi-
grants who acquired a license are obtained by using the QTE coefficients
together with the covariate means among those who acquired a license
and by setting the licensing status dummy to zero. The counterfactual
earnings of all immigrants with a license can be approximated by the
counterfactual earnings of compliers (individuals whose treatment status
is affected by the instrument), under the assumption that compliers are
a random sample of all immigrants with a license. The monthly earnings
without a license for immigrants who did not acquire a license are also
computed conditional on the mean of the covariates among immigrants
who acquired a license, and with the licensing status dummy set to zero,
but using the quantile regression coefficients.
The top panel of table 6 shows that licensed immigrants have lower
potential earnings without a license than unlicensed immigrants at all
examined quantiles. The negative selection bias is greatest in the tails and
at the median of the distribution, varying between 36% and 38%. The
bottom panel of table 6 shows that negative selection bias is also present
at the median of potential earnings in the discontinuity sample.
VII. Conclusion
This study measures the effects of occupational licensing requirements
by exploiting an immigrant physician retraining assignment rule. The OLS
estimates of the returns to a license among immigrant physicians in Israel
range between 90% and 114%. Instrumental variables estimates of the
returns range between 180% and 340%. The large IV estimates, compared
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to OLS estimates, are suggestive of the presence of rents accruing to
practitioners and negative selection into licensing status.
In order to give an economic interpretation to the OLS and IV esti-
mates, we develop a model of optimal license acquisition. According to
the model, IV estimates that exceed OLS estimates imply that stricter
relicensing requirements lead to lower average quality of service in the
licensed occupation. The policy implication of the results is that lowering
the costs of acquiring a license may raise physician quality.
As a robustness check, the returns to an occupational license are also
estimated using a QTE model. The QTE estimates indicate that the returns
to an occupational license are largest at the upper quantiles of the earnings
distribution. Conventional quantile regression estimates indicate that the
returns to a license are largest at the lower quantiles. The QTE estimates
also illustrate that standard IV estimates are more sensitive to high-earn-
ings outliers than the inclusion of zero earnings for the unemployed. The
QTE estimates of the counterfactual distribution of earnings without a
license among those immigrants who obtained a license also provide a
rich picture of negative selection into licensing status.
The particular social experiment that we exploit in this article to identify
the causal effects of relicensing requirements in the market for physicians
may be relevant in other contexts. Other countries use similar licensing
regimes for immigrants as well as for internal migrants. Future research
could examine the earnings and quality effects of relicensing regimes in
other countries and in other professions using a methodology similar to
the one employed in this study.
Appendix
The Quantile Treatment Effects Model
The QTE model specifies a linear relationship between earnings and
licensing status at each quantile. That is,
′Q (YFX , L , L 1 L )p X b  L a , (A1)v i i i 1i 0i i v i v
where denotes licensing status when assigned to the observation trackL1i
and denotes licensing status when assigned to the exam(TR p 1) Li 0i
track . The time in Israel subscript is suppressed for conven-(TR p 0)i
ience. The coefficient has a causal interpretation because is inde-a Lv i
pendent of potential earnings outcomes conditional on and being aXi
complier . The proof is found in Abadie et al. (2002).(L 1 L )1i 0i
The parameters of the QTE model are estimated by minimizing the
sample analog of
′( )E k r YX b  L a , (A2)[ ]i v i i v i v
where is the check function and is weights that transform ther kv i
conventional quantile regression minimand into a problem for compliers
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only. For computational reasons, is replaced by an estimate ofk i
, whereE(k FX , L , Y)i i i i
L [1 E(TR FY , L , X )]i i i i iE(k FX , L , Y)p 1 (A3)i i i i [1 E(TR FX )]i i
(1 L )E(TR FY , L , X )i i i i i
 .
E(TR FX )i i
The first-step estimate of is obtained by separately esti-E(k FX , L , Y)i i i i
mating and with a probit. Predicted values ofE(TR FY , L , X ) E(TR FX )i i i i i i
that are negative are set to zero, leading to a reduced sampleE(k FX , L , Y)i i i i
size. Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping the first- and second-
step estimations 100 times.
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